Pricing Open Source Software by Kim, Byungcho et al.
Association for Information Systems
AIS Electronic Library (AISeL)
ICIS 2006 Proceedings International Conference on Information Systems(ICIS)
December 2006







Follow this and additional works at: http://aisel.aisnet.org/icis2006
This material is brought to you by the International Conference on Information Systems (ICIS) at AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). It has been accepted
for inclusion in ICIS 2006 Proceedings by an authorized administrator of AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). For more information, please contact
elibrary@aisnet.org.
Recommended Citation
Kim, Byungcho; Chen, Pei-yu; and Mukhopadhyay, Tridas, "Pricing Open Source Software" (2006). ICIS 2006 Proceedings. 24.
http://aisel.aisnet.org/icis2006/24
 Twenty-Seventh International Conference on Information Systems, Milwaukee 2006 341 
PRICING OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE 
Economics and Information Systems  
 
 
Byung Cho Kim 
Tepper School of Business 




Tepper School of Business 
Carnegie Mellon University 




Tepper School of Business 





In this paper, we examine the issue of pricing open source software. We compare three different 
pricing mechanisms: commercial software, open source software dual-licensing, and open source 
software support. We investigate whether the open source software pricing models are viable 
under monopoly and duopoly when an open source software vendor competes with a commercial 
software vendor. Our model considers the motivation for and the barrier to open source software 
adoption, which provides a better picture of the open source software market. We identify the 
factors that affect the optimal pricing strategy of the commercial and the open source software 
vendors. Our results can give pricing guidelines to the open source software vendors in the case of 
monopoly and duopoly, which is not clear in the current state. 
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Introduction 
Open Source Software (OSS) is software for which the source code is available to the public, enabling anyone to 
copy, modify, and redistribute the source code (Varian and Shapiro 2003). Commercial software, by contrast, is 
software that is distributed under commercial license agreements, usually for a fee. Open source was a service mark 
of the Open Source Initiative (OSI), a non-profit organization that continues to provide an official "Open Source 
Definition". According to OSI definition, open source software is software whose source code can be freely 
modified and redistributed1. The redistribution rights do not preclude a company selling such software for profit. 
                                                          
1 The Open Source Definition. http://opensource.org/docs/definition.php 
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Recently open source software is getting more attention from not only software developers but also users, including 
governments and large enterprises. According to the Economist (2003), many countries in European Union and Asia 
are funding open source software initiatives outright. For example, Japan announced that it would collaborate with 
China and South Korea to develop open source alternatives to Microsoft’s software, and it has already allocated nine 
million US dollars to the project. According to BBC, the Brazilian government announced that it would adopt open 
source software. As a result, Brazil’s government ministries and state-run enterprises are abandoning Windows in 
favor of open source software, like Linux (Kingstone 2005). Open source adoption is rising in the industry sector as 
well. A recent survey by Forrester Research shows that 46 percent of the 140 North American firms were using open 
source software and 14 percent had a plan to use it in 2004.  In 2005, open source usage was even higher. Among 
128 respondents, 56% were using open source software and 19% were planning (Gloude 2005).  Especially, Linux is 
already adopted by 74% of the respondents and is considered for adoption by 22%. Other widely adopted open 
source software includes Apache, MySQL, and JBoss. 
Why are firms using open source software? The Free/Libre and Open Source Software (FLOSS) Survey 2002 found 
that enterprises are adopting open source software on the grounds of higher stability, cost savings, and flexibility due 
to the open and modifiable source code (Wichmann 2002). Independence from pricing and licensing policies of big 
software companies and better availability of IT specialists are also considered to be motivations for open source 
software usage. Another survey by the International Data Corporation (IDC) shows that firms are using open source 
software because of its quality and flexibility, rather than merely considering it "good enough" because it is 
inexpensive (Broersma 2005). Such firms consider the customizability of open source software to be important, 
since they believe that vendors of pre-packaged, proprietary software routinely downplay the customizability of 
open source software, arguing customers are not interested in extending software functions themselves. On the other 
hand, a user survey by Forrester Research finds that the top barriers to open source adoption by firms include the 
lack of support and the availability of applications (Reid 2004). Companies are also concerned about not having 
skilled workers to support or use open source applications, licensing costs, and security. Another survey by Actuate, 
conducted in 2006, reflects opinions from 141 respondents in the financial services sector. It shows that the majority 
of respondents cited the availability of long-term support (58.2%) as the main barrier to adopting open source 
software and the availability of long-term maintenance was a close second-place barrier (44.7%). The benefits 
include cost savings (55%), vendor independence (49.3%), and flexibility (47.1%) (McCarthy 2006).  
Lately a new movement in the open source software industry has been observed. As some open source software 
products become popular and their market shares approach critical mass, the vendors of such software seek to 
capitalize on the publicity and popularity of their software products. Two approaches have been successful in 
commercializing open source software: the dual-licensing model and the support model. With the dual-licensing 
model, a software vendor offers the very same software under two different licenses. Open source license allows the 
licensees to modify, distribute, and use the software for free, but it requires the release of any modifications under 
the same open source license. The commercial license permits using and developing the software under standard 
commercial terms. MySQL and Openoffice are the examples of the dual-licensing model. A second approach is the 
support model, which allows users to get the software for free, but the software vendor charges users for support. 
Although the viability of this model is still questioned, RedHat and JBoss have been successful commercializing 
their products by adopting the support model.  
There is a lively debate going on among industry experts about the viability and the scalability of the commercial 
model of the open source software (Moczar 2005; Vaughan-Nichols 2005). Recently the issue of open source 
software is receiving substantial attention from academic researchers. Raghunathan et al. (2005) examine the quality 
debate in open source software by setting up an analytical model. They show that open source software quality is not 
necessarily lower than commercial software quality. Casadesus-Masanell and Ghemawat (2006) analyze a dynamic 
mixed duopoly in which a for-profit proprietary software vendor interacts with an open source software vendor that 
prices at zero in the presence of demand-side learning effects. Economides and Katsamakas (2006) analyze the 
optimal two-sided pricing strategy of a platform firm and compare industry structures based on a proprietary 
platform such as Microsoft Windows with those based on an open source platform such as Linux. All the papers that 
examine the issue of open source software from an economic perspective assume that the open source software 
vendor prices at zero and makes no profit. From a legal perspective, some research has been done on this for-profit 
open source software (Gomulkiewicz 2004; Välimäki 2003). The issue of pricing information goods has also been 
extensively studied (Choudhary et al. 2005; Dewan and Mendelson 1990; Hitt and Chen 2005; Mendelson and 
Whang 1990; Png and Chen 2003; Sundararajan 2004; Westland 1992). To our best knowledge, no research has 
examined the issue of open source software pricing from an economic perspective. In this paper, we examine the 
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optimal pricing strategies of both the commercial and the open source software vendors and find the conditions 
under which a for-profit open source model is viable.   
We only consider the businesses as the customers in this paper, since the commercial open source software models 
do not target individual software users. Our model captures two sources of customer heterogeneity in their valuation 
of software: taste and tech-savviness. Customers value the same software differently. For example, a company in an 
industry using information technology heavily may have higher valuation of the software than other firms, since a 
significant portion of their business may depend on information systems powered by the software. Taste parameter 
captures this heterogeneity in customer taste. We consider two types of customers in terms of their tech-savviness. 
Along with cost savings, benefits from customizability and flexibility are considered as the top reasons for open 
source adoption. When an in-house IT management team with skilled workers is available, the firm can enjoy such 
benefits, since it has the capability of customizing and managing the open source software. When a firm does not 
have such capability of managing technology, open source software incurs significant support cost, which is cited as 
the main barrier to open source adoption. We consider the firms with a strong in-house IT management team to be 
high-type customers and the others to be low-type customers. Reflecting reality, we assume that high-type customers 
enjoy benefit from flexibility and customizability whereas low-type customers suffer from support cost when they 
use open source software.  
We compare three different pricing mechanisms: commercial software, open source dual-licensing, and open source 
support. We first examine the optimal pricing strategies for each pricing scheme under a monopoly setting. We find 
that the monopoly price for open source software under dual-licensing is higher than the commercial software price, 
hence higher profit, if the total flexibility benefit for the high-type customers is higher than total support cost for the 
low-type customers. Under the support model, the open source vendor charges for support at higher price than the 
commercial software price, but it makes lower profit than the commercial software vendor. Then we investigate 
whether the open source software vendor prefers a certain pricing mechanism in the monopoly market. Our result 
shows that the dual-licensing model is more profitable when the difference between flexibility benefit and support 
cost exceeds a certain threshold. Otherwise, the open source vendor prefers the support model. The optimal choice 
between the dual-licensing model and the support model also depends on other factors such as marginal cost for 
support and proportion of the high-type and low-type customers. Our paper can give guidelines to the open source 
software vendors that may have difficulty in making pricing decisions in the current environment. 
We extend our model to a duopoly competition setting. The first scenario models competition between a commercial 
software vendor and an open source software vendor with a dual-licensing model. We analyze the optimal pricing 
strategies of each software vendor. We find the conditions under which an equilibrium exists. At equilibrium, the 
commercial and the open source software vendors split the market. The open source software vendor with a dual-
licensing model serves high-type customers only, charging higher price than the commercial software vendor that 
covers the low-type segment. We find that the open source software vendor charges more than the commercial 
software when flexibility benefit is high. When the open source software does not provide much flexibility benefit, 
the commercial software vendor sells its software at higher price than the open source software.  
Our result proves the viability of the dual-licensing model of the open source software in the presence of 
competition with commercial software. Next, we study the duopoly software market when there is competition 
between a commercial software vendor and an open source software vendor with a support model. The profitability 
of the support model has been questioned since all the customers can get the software for free and the vendor can 
sell its support only to the customers in need, who are low-type customers in our model. We find that the 
commercial software vendor competing against the open source support model charges price equal to the open 
source vendor’s marginal cost for support. With this pricing strategy of the commercial software vendor, the support 
model brings zero profit to the open source software vendor. 
We also investigate whether the open source support model is viable in other settings. By setting up a two-period 
model, we examine the role of switching cost and study the optimal pricing strategies of both the commercial and 
the open source software vendors. The result is consistent with the case with no switching cost in the sense that the 
commercial software vendor sets up its price to prevent positive profit for the open source vendor. When the 
switching cost is large, the commercial vendor charges a low price in the first period and increases its price in the 
second so that it can have a large installed base in the first period and lock in the customers in the second. However, 
with small switching cost, the commercial vendor charges higher price in the first period than in the second since 
increasing its installed base is not very effective in raising switching cost to the customers. Finally, we examine the 
case of quality asymmetry. Interestingly, we find that the open source support model is viable in the presence of 
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quality asymmetry no matter whether the quality of the open source software is higher or lower than the commercial 
software quality. The case of the open source software with higher quality is reasonable. The opposite case is 
interesting in the sense that the open source software with lower quality is profitable while the open source software 
with the same quality as the commercial software is not. This can be explained as market expansion for the 
commercial software. When both vendors offer the same quality software, the high-type customers have no 
incentive to buy the commercial software, since the open source software is free and they do not need any support. 
However, when the commercial software is superior to the open source software, some high-type customers may 
buy the commercial software, implying that the commercial software vendor can target such high-type customers as 
well. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We present our model in Section 2 and examine each of the three 
pricing mechanisms under monopoly in Section 3. In Section 4, we extend our model to a duopoly competition 
between a commercial software vendor and an open source software vendor with each of the open source pricing 
models. We investigate whether the open source support model is viable in the presence of other factors such as 
switching cost and quality asymmetry in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.  
Model 
We analyze the optimal pricing decisions of an open source software vendor and investigate whether the emerging 
pricing schemes for open source software are viable in both monopoly and duopoly cases where the open source 
software vendor competes against a commercial software vendor. We consider two models of open source software 
pricing: the dual-licensing model and the support model. The dual-licensing model provides the same open source 
software under two different licenses: open source license and commercial license. Users who want to donate their 
source code to the Open Source community can license their software under the General Public License (GPL), 
which is the most popular free software license. Under the open source license, the licensees can freely modify, 
distribute, and use the software at no charge. On the other hand, any users who want to use the open source software 
for profit seeking purpose must purchase a commercial license. MySQL and Openoffice are following the dual-
licensing model. Under the support model, users can get the software for free, but the software vendor charges the 
users for support. RedHat and JBoss are examples of successful open source support model.  
Customers 
Customers in our model are firms, not individual software users. Potential customers divide into two segments. A 
proportion µ of customers are technically savvy, and we call them high-type customers. These customers have a 
capable in-house IT management team. We assume that the high-type customers can take advantage of the flexibility 
of the open source software by customizing the source code and that their in-house IT management team can handle 
maintenance so that they do not need any further support from a vendor or a third party. The high-type customers 
may adopt the open source software not only because open source software has cost advantage but also it gives 
flexibility. Customers in the remaining fraction (1 – µ) are low-type customers that may incur support cost if they 
adopt the open source software. The low-type customers’ incentive for open source adoption may be cost savings 
only.  
 
Figure 1. Fractions of Customers in Software Market 
 
No matter which segment a customer is in, the customer does not enjoy any flexibility benefit or suffer from support 
cost when it uses commercial software. Within each segment, potential customers are characterized by their value, v, 
Customers 
Low-type (1-µ) High-type (µ) 
0 1-µ 1 
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from the software. We assume that v is uniformly distributed on [0, 1], which leads to a linear demand curve. We 
also assume risk neutrality of the customers. 
Software Pricing Schemes 
We examine a commercial software model and two open source pricing schemes: the dual-licensing model and the 
support model. In this section, we present our model and derive customer utility and vendor profit under each of the 
three software pricing mechanisms.  
Commercial Software 
When a customer buys the commercial software, her benefit would be the same no matter which type the customer 
is. In other words, commercial software incurs neither flexibility benefit nor support cost to the customer. In reality, 
the commercial software may incur some level of flexibility benefit and/or support cost, which is not significant 
compared to the case of the open source software. In the open source pricing models, we consider the relative 
benefit and cost from the open source software. C in the subscript means commercial software. Let Cp  be the price 
of the commercial software. The customer’s utility would be 
.CC pvu −=  
Let Cq  be the demand for the commercial software. Then the profit for the commercial software vendor would be 
.CCC pq=π  
Open Source Software: Dual-Licensing Model 
We label the high-type customers H and the low-type customers L. The proportion of the high-type customers is µ 
and the remaining proportion (1 – µ) is the low-type segment. D in the subscript represents the dual-licensing model 
of open source software. When adopting open source software, a high-type customer enjoys the flexibility benefit 
whereas a low-type customer suffers from the support cost. Let f be the flexibility benefit and s be the support cost. 
Dp  denotes the price of the open source software with a commercial license. The net benefits for a high-type 








Let DHq  and DLq  be the demand for the open source software under dual-licensing pricing scheme from the high-
type and the low-type segments, respectively. The profit for the open source software vendor adopting the dual-
licensing model would be 
.})1({ DDLDHD pqq µµπ −+=  
Open Source Software: Support Model 
Let S in the subscript represent the support model for open source software. Under this pricing scheme, the open 
source software vendor provides the software at no charge. The vendor makes profit by selling its support service to 
the users in need. Let Sp  be the price for the support. The net benefits for a high-type and a low-type customer are 







Note that Sp  is bounded by the support cost s. If Sp  exceeds s, no customer would buy support service. Since the 
high-type customers use the software for free and would never ask for any support, the vendor makes profit from the 
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low-type customers only. Let Sq  be the demand for the support. We assume that support and service incur marginal 
cost, Sc . The profit for the open source software vendor adopting the support model would be 
)()1( SSSS cpq −−= µπ . 
Table 1 summarizes utility that a customer enjoys from software under each of the three mechanisms. 
Table 1. Utility from Software 
 High-Type Low-Type 
Commercial Cpv −  Cpv −  
OSS: Dual-Licensing fpv D +−  spv D −−  
OSS: Support fv +  Spv −  
Monopoly 
In this section, we examine the optimal pricing strategies for each pricing scheme under monopoly. We compare 
prices and profits of the three pricing models: commercial, open source dual-licensing, and open source support. We 
investigate whether each mechanism is viable when the software vendor monopolizes the market. Since a business 
model that is not viable under monopoly is not likely to survive competition, examining the monopoly case is 
relevant, although monopoly may not be realistic for most for-profit open source software.  
Price 
Commercial Software 





CC pdvq  
The profit for the commercial software vendor is 
.)1( CCCC pppq −==π  










resulting in the profit-maximizing price as 
.
2
1* =Cp  
Open Source Software: Dual-Licensing Model 


















The open source software vendor adopting a dual-licensing gets the following profit:  
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Open Source Software: Support Model 
Under the support model, the open source software vendor makes profit out of low-type customers only. The 





SS pdvq µµ  
The profit for the open source software is then 
)()1()1( )( SSSSSSS cppcpq −−−=−= µπ  





















In this section, we compare the profits of the three different software pricing models and investigate how much 
profit the open source software pricing scheme brings compared to commercial software. We examine the viability 
of the open source software pricing models in a monopolized software market. Note that the commercial software 
vendor makes the following profit at the optimal price: 
.
4
1)1( *** =−= CCC ppπ  
The profit for the open source software vendor with a dual licensing model at the optimal price would be 
.}1)1({
4
1       

















Finally, with a support model, the open source software vendor makes its profit as follows: 
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Comparison of the optimal prices leads to the following Proposition. 
Proposition 1: Under monopoly, the open source software with a dual-licensing model charges higher price than 
the commercial software vendor )( ** CD pp >  and makes higher profit )(
**
CD ππ >  if total flexibility benefit for the 
high-type customers is higher than total support cost for the low-type customers ).)1(( sf µµ −>  
Otherwise ))1(( sf µµ −< , the commercial software is more expensive )( ** CD pp < and more profitable 
)( ** CD ππ < than the open source software with a dual-licensing model. With a support model, the open source 
software vendor provides support at higher price than commercial software price )( ** CS pp >  with making less profit 
)( ** CS ππ < . 
Proof. See the Appendix. 
When an open source software vendor with a dual-licensing model monopolizes the market, the open source 
software price depends on flexibility benefit, support cost and proportion of high-type customers. If the total 
flexibility benefit for the high-type customers exceeds the total support cost for the low-type customers, open source 
software can be more expensive than commercial software. Otherwise, open source software charges a price lower 
than commercial software. Interestingly, with a support model, an open source vendor sells its support at higher 
price than the commercial software price. Since the profitable customers for the open source support model is only 
the low-type segment, the open source vendor’s optimal strategy is charging high price for support. This may 
contradict the results from the survey on motivation for open source adoption, which cites cost advantage on the top 
of the list. In reality, monopoly may not be the case for most for-profit open source software. Proposition 1 shows 
the optimal pricing strategies of the open source software as a benchmark. We also find that both pricing models for 
open source software are viable when the software vendor monopolizes the market. Interestingly, an open source 
vendor can make higher profit than a commercial software vendor under monopoly by adopting a dual-licensing 
model. However, with a support model, the profit for the open source is always lower than the profit from 
commercial software. Then which pricing scheme is better for the open source software vendor that monopolizes the 
market? Dual-licensing model or support model? We next examine the strategic incentive of the open source 
software vendor for each pricing scheme and find the conditions under which one mechanism is better than the other.  
Proposition 2: Under monopoly, a dual-licensing model is more profitable than a support model )( ** SD ππ > when 
.1)1(1)1( −−−>−− Scsf µµµ The open source software vendor makes more profit with a support model than 
with a dual licensing model )( ** SD ππ <  when .1)1(1)1( −−−<−− Scsf µµµ  
Proof.  






SSD csf −−−+−−=− µµµππ  
Since 01)1( >+−− sf µµ  and 1≤Sc , 
**
SD ππ >      if     1)1(1)1( −−−>−− Scsf µµµ  
**
SD ππ <      if     .1)1(1)1( −−−<−− Scsf µµµ   
QED. 
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Proposition 2 shows the conditions under which the monopolist open source vendor makes a choice between the 
dual-licensing model and the support model. The result implies that the dual-licensing model is better than the 
support model if the total net benefit from open source, which is the difference between the total flexibility benefit 
and total support cost, is greater than a certain threshold. If the net benefit does not reach the threshold, the support 






Flexibility      
 (f)             
Support Cost (s)
Flexibility






Figure 2.  Open Source Pricing under Monopoly 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the role of the marginal cost for support and the proportion of the high-type customers to the 
framework. It is shown that the dual-licensing model is preferred in the upper-left region while the support model is 
chosen in the lower-right region. As the marginal cost for support increases, the region for the dual-licensing model 
becomes wider. This is reasonable in the sense that the support model is less viable when the marginal cost for 
support is higher. The proportion of the high-type customers tilts the line while the marginal cost shifts it. As the 
high-type segment becomes bigger, the dual-licensing model becomes more preferable. This makes sense because 
the high-type customers are profitable only to the vendor with the dual-licensing model. Thus, an increase in the 
proportion of the high-type customers makes the dual-licensing model more attractive to the open source software 
vendor.  
Competition 
In the real world, there are successful examples of for-profit open source software competing with commercial 
software. With a dual-licensing model, MySQL competes against Oracle, IBM DB2, and Microsoft SQL server. 
RedHat Enterprise Linux, which is a commercial version with support and service, competes against Microsoft 
Windows. In this section, we study the optimal pricing strategies of the commercial and the open source software 
vendors in more realistic cases. We extend our model to a duopoly competition setting. First, we examine the 
competition between a commercial software vendor and an open source software vendor with a dual-licensing model. 
Then we study the case where an open source software vendor with a support model competes against a commercial 
software vendor. 
Open Source Software with Dual-Licensing versus Commercial Software 
Recall that a customer enjoys the following utility by adopting commercial software: 
.CC pvu −=  
The open source software vendor with a dual-licensing model provides the following benefits to a high-type 
customer and a low-type customer, respectively. 
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A further analysis of the customer benefits leads to Proposition 3. 
Proposition 3: In a duopoly market with a commercial software vendor and an open source software vendor with a 
dual-licensing model, the commercial software vendor serves low-type customers while the open source software 
vendor serves high-type customers. An equilibrium exists in the presence of sufficient flexibility benefit and support 
cost ).
2
1  ( ≥≥ sandf µ  When flexibility benefit is high and support cost is low ),
2
10  ( <<≥ sandf µ the 
condition for an equilibrium to exist is as follows: 
).21)(122()1( 2 ssff −++≥+ µµµ  
The optimal prices are 
. 
2
1     
2
1 ** fp andp DC
+
==  
Proof. See the Appendix. 
We find that a commercial software vendor and an open source software vendor with a dual-licensing model target 
different segments of the customers. When they compete against each other, a commercial software vendor serves 
the low-type customers while an open source software vendor serves the high-type customers. This is consistent 
with the literature on product discrimination and versioning in the sense that the high-type customers choose high-
value products, open source software in this case, since it provides flexibility benefit in addition to the original value 
of the product to the high-type customers. Our findings support viability of the dual-licensing model for open source 
software. 
Open Source Software with Support versus Commercial Software 
We examine a duopoly software market where an open source software vendor with a support model competes with 
a commercial software vendor. We investigate whether the support model is viable in this market and examine the 
impact of competition on each vendor’s profit. Recall that net benefit from commercial software would be 
.CC pvu −=  
On the other hand, open source software with a support model gives different levels of benefit to the customers in 
different types: 







Proposition 4: In a duopoly market with a commercial software vendor and an open source software vendor with a 
support model, the commercial software vendor charges price at the open source vendor’s marginal cost for support 
).( * SC cp =  The commercial software vendor makes a positive profit ))1)(1(( SSC cc−−= µπ  while the open source 








Sc , the commercial 
software vendor charges its monopoly price. 
Proof. Consider the high-type customers. Since SHCC ufvpvu =+<−= , high-type customers always choose the 
open source software. Thus, both vendors compete for the low-type segment only. The demand for the commercial 
and the open source software would be 
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First, no vendor charges less than marginal cost to avoid making negative profit. That is, 
.     and     0 SSC cpp ≥≥  
Second, there cannot be an equilibrium in which both Cp  and Sp  are strictly above Sc . Consider the case where 
.  SSC cpp >>  Then the commercial software vendor can obtain the entire demand and increases its profit by 
charging at ε−Sp  where ε  is a small and positive number.  If SCS cpp >>  , the open source software vendor has 
an incentive to lower its support charge to ε−Cp . Suppose that . SSC cpp >=  Both vendors still want to lower 
their prices by ε  so that they can increase profit.   
Finally, the commercial software vendor can obtain the entire demand by charging .ε−Sc  The equilibrium prices 
can be obtained as 
.** SSC cpp ==  
The commercial software has the whole market and the open source software vendor makes zero profit. The profit 
for the commercial software vendor would be 




<< Sc , the commercial vendor charges its monopoly price 2
1









Unlike the dual-licensing model, the open source support model is not viable in a duopoly market. The commercial 
software vendor’s best strategy is not to allow the open source vendor to make any positive profit by aggressive 
pricing. Since there is an asymmetry in marginal cost, the open source software vendor is not able to survive the 
competition. Our result shows that the commercial software vendor provides its software at the open source software 
vendor’s marginal cost for support. Consequently, the open source vendor makes zero profit while the commercial 
software vendor is able to make positive profit. 
Viability of Open Source Software Support Model 
Our findings show that the support model for open source software is not viable in a duopoly market. However, 
some open source software vendors such as RedHat and JBoss have been successful in commercializing their 
software by adopting a support model. In this section, we consider other possible factors that may affect the 
competition framework. We investigate whether the open source support model is viable in other settings. First, we 
examine the role of switching cost to the competition by setting up a two-period model, and study the optimal 
pricing strategies of both the commercial and the open source software vendors. Then we examine the different 
quality case and study how asymmetry in quality affects the viability of the support model under competition. 
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Competition in the Presence of Switching Cost 
In reality, an open source software vendor enters the market which has been dominated by a monopolist commercial 
software vendor such as Microsoft. In addition to software price, software adoption incurs significant switching cost 
when a user wants to switch from one software product to another. For example, in addition to direct cost for 
software adoption, changing from Microsoft Windows to Linux requires time and effort for learning Linux and cost 
for Linux-compatible applications. Such costs are considered as switching costs. In this section, we investigate 
whether the presence of switching costs changes the competition framework by setting up a two-period model. The 
decision flow is explained as below. 
Period 1: Commercial Software Only 
- Commercial software vendor introduces software at price 1p  for period 1 licensing. 
- Customers decide whether or not to buy the software.  
- The demand for commercial software ( 1x ) is determined. 
Period 2: Commercial versus Open Source 
- Period 2 game is based on the customers who purchased commercial software in period 1.  
- A commercial software vendor offers software at price 2p  for period 2 licensing. 
- At the same time, an open source software vendor gives the software for free to both types and provides 
support at Sp  to customers in need. 
- Customers choose either of the following strategies. 
- Stay with the commercial software and pay 2p .  
- Switch to open source software and incur switching cost 1wx   
(Switching cost depends on the scale parameter w  and the market size 1x ) 
- Exit, i.e., do not buy any software. 
We consider the case where there is a sufficient switching cost, in other words, the maximum possible level of 
switching cost is greater than the flexibility benefit )( fw > . In this game, a customer has four strategic choices. A 
customer can buy commercial software in both period 1 and 2 (CC), or buy commercial software in period 1 and 
switch to open source software in period 2 (CO). It is also possible that the customer who buys the commercial 
software in period 1 chooses not to buy any in period 2 (CX). Finally, a customer can choose not to buy any 
software in any period (XX). Then high-type and low-type customers enjoy the following utility from each choice. 
0                                         0     
                                      
               
                        














A further analysis leads to Proposition 5. 
Proposition 5: In the presence of the switching cost, a commercial software vendor sets up its price to prevent 
positive profit for the open source vendor with a support model. The optimal first and second period prices for the 





























Proof. See the Appendix. 
The result is consistent with the case where no switching cost is present in the sense that the open source software 
vendor cannot make any profit with a support model. In the presence of switching cost, the commercial software 
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vendor follows a pricing strategy not to allow positive profit for the open source vendor. Consequently, the open 
source software vendor does not have any incentive to enter the market. This result implies that the open source 
software support model is not viable when the open source software vendor competes with the commercial software 
vendor no matter whether switching cost is present or not.  
 
Figure 3.  Price, Profit, and Switching Cost 
 
Figure 3 illustrates the optimal first and second period prices and the profit for the commercial software. When the 
scale parameter for the switching cost is sufficiently large, the commercial software vendor charges low price in the 
first period and increases its price in the second so that it can have a large installed base in the first period and lock 
in the customers in the second. When the scale parameter is small, the commercial vendor cannot increase switching 
cost in the second period efficiently by having a large installed base in the first period. Thus, the optimal strategy is 
to charge higher price in the first period than in the second to maximize its profit. Interestingly, we find that the 
profit does not always increase with the scale parameter for the switching cost.  
Quality Difference 
We examine the different quality case and study how asymmetry in quality affects the viability of the open source 
software support model in competition. Let α  be the quality difference parameter, which is a proportion of the 
value of the commercial software to the value of the open source software. We assume that quality is the only factor 
that affects the value of software. We use software value and software quality interchangeably. Then the customer’s 
utility from the commercial software would be  
.CC pvu −=α  
Recall that the net benefit from the open source software with a support model is 







There are two possible cases of asymmetric quality. The commercial software offers higher quality than the open 
source software ( 1>α ) and the open source software quality is higher than the commercial software ( 10 << α ). 
We start with the former case. 
Case 1: Better Commercial Software ( 1>α ) 
High-Type Customers 
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Note that fvpvuu CSHC −−−=− α . The customer in the high-type segment would buy the commercial software 
,0>− SHC uu  i.e. fpv C +>− )1(α . Since 1>α , 
freefor  software sourceopen Get              
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The customer in the low-type segment would buy the commercial software ,0>− SLC uu  i.e. SC ppv −>− )1(α . 
softwareany buy Not                       0
supportbuy  and software sourceopen Get           
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The profit for the commercial vendor is 
.}1)1{(
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The profit for the open source software vendor comes from only low-type customers. Thus, 
).)()(1(
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The first-order condition is 
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Case 2: Better Open Source Software ( 10 <<α ) 
High-Type Customers 
Note that .0)1( <−−−−=−−−=− fpvfvpvuu cCSHC αα Thus, high-type customers always choose the open 
source software. When the open source software provides higher quality than the commercial software, both 
software vendors target the low-type customers only.  
Low-Type Customers 
The customer in a low-type segment would buy open source software ,0>− CSL uu  i.e. .)1( CS ppv −>−α  
softwareany buy Not                       0
software commercialBuy           
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The profit for the commercial software vendor is 
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The profit for the open source software vendor is 
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A further analysis of the prices leads to the Proposition 6. 
Proposition 6: In a software market where the commercial software vendor provides higher quality than the open 
source software with a support model )1( >α , the commercial software vendor charges more for the 
software )( ↑Cp  and the open source software vendor charges more for the support )( ↑Sp as the  quality difference 
between the commercial software and the open source software increases )( ↑α . The price difference )( SC pp −  
increases with the quality difference. When the open source software quality is higher than the commercial 
software )10( <<α , the open source software vendor charges more on support )( ↑Sp  as the quality difference 
increases )( ↓α . When the marginal cost for support is low ),
4
30( << Sc  commercial software price 
increases )( ↑Cp  with quality difference )( ↓α . Otherwise ),14
3( << Sc  commercial software price decreases )( ↓Cp  
with quality difference )( ↓α .  
Proof. See the Appendix. 
Proposition 6 shows that the open source support model is viable in the presence of quality asymmetry. No matter 
whether the quality of the open source software is higher or lower than the commercial software, the open source 
software vendor makes profit with a support model in a duopoly market. When the open source software has higher 
quality, it is reasonable that the open source software is profitable. The opposite case is interesting in the sense that 
the open source software with lower quality is also profitable although we find that the open source software with 
same quality as the commercial software is not. This can be explained as the market expansion of the commercial 
software vendor. When the quality is identical for both vendors, the high-type customers have no incentive to buy 
the commercial software, since the open source software is free and they do not need any support. However, when 
the commercial software offers higher quality than the open source software, some high-type customers will buy the 
commercial software, which implies that the commercial software vendor can target such high-type customers as 
well. 
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           (a) Better Commercial Software ( 1>α )                          (b) Better Open Source Software ( 10 << α ) 
Figure 4.  Software Price and Profit 
 
Figure 4 illustrates the optimal prices and profits with respect to the quality difference. Unlike the case of symmetric 
quality, the open source software vendor with a support model can make positive profit in the presence of quality 
asymmetry. Even when the open source software provides worse quality, the open source software vendor makes a 
thin but positive profit. As mentioned earlier, this can be a result of market expansion. This quality difference can be 
one possible way to explain the successful open source support model by some open source software vendors such 
as RedHat and JBoss. Our findings support the viability of the open source software support model. 
Conclusion 
In this paper, we compare three different software pricing mechanisms: commercial software, open source dual-
licensing, and open source software support. We start with examining the optimal pricing strategies of a software 
vendor with each pricing scheme under monopoly. We find that the monopoly price for open source software under 
dual-licensing is higher than the commercial software price, hence higher profit, if total flexibility benefit for the 
high-type customers exceeds total support cost for the low-type customers. With a support model, the open source 
vendor charges for support at higher price than the commercial software price, but it makes a lower profit than the 
commercial software vendor. Then we investigate whether the open source software vendor prefers one pricing 
mechanism over the other in the monopoly market. Our result shows that the dual-licensing model is more profitable 
when the difference between flexibility benefit and support cost is high. Otherwise, the support model is preferred. 
We identify the factors that affect the open source software vendor’s decision.  
We extend our model to a duopoly competition setting. In a market with competition between a commercial 
software vendor and an open source software vendor with a dual-licensing model, the open source software vendor 
serves high-type customers only by charging more than the commercial software vendor that covers low-type 
segment only. Our result supports the viability of the dual-licensing model for the open source software in the 
presence of competition. When there is a competition between a commercial software vendor and an open source 
software vendor with a support model, the commercial software vendor competing against the open source support 
model charges a price equal to the open source vendor’s marginal cost of support. With this pricing strategy of the 
commercial software vendor, the support model brings zero profit to the open source software vendor. 
We focus on the viability of the support model for the open source software. We examine the role of switching cost 
to the competition between commercial and open source software. The result is consistent with the case where no 
switching cost is present in the sense that the open source software vendor cannot make any positive profit. The 
optimal pricing strategy of the commercial software vendor is interesting. When the switching cost is large, the 
commercial software vendor charges a low price in the first period, and increases its price in the second so that it can 
have a large installed base in the first period and lock in the customers in the second. However, with small switching 
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cost, the commercial software vendor charges a higher price in the first period than in the second, since increasing 
its installed base is not very effective in raising switching cost to the customers. Next, we examine the different 
quality case. Interestingly, we find that the open source software support model is viable in the presence of quality 
asymmetry no matter whether the quality of the open source software is higher or lower than the commercial 
software. Even when the open source software provides lower quality, the support model is profitable. This can be 
explained as market expansion of the commercial software vendor.  
Our paper contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, this paper is the first study that examines the 
issue of pricing open source software through an economic lens. In spite of the growing interest in the commercial 
open source software among industry experts and jurists, no academic study has shown the viability of the pricing 
models of for-profit open source software. We identify the factors that affect the viability of the pricing models for 
open source software and find the conditions under which each model can be successful. Second, our result can give 
pricing guidelines to the open source software vendors, which is not clear in the current state. Finally, we model the 
motivation for and the barrier to open source adoption, which provides a better picture of the open source software 
market. Considering such factors, consistent with survey statistics, may allow us to better understand the issue of 
open source software. 
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Appendix 
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Therefore, .** CS ππ <  QED. 
 
Proof of Proposition 3 
Recall that a customer’s utility from commercial software would be 
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Note that the commercial software vendor loses all the demand if it charges price Cp  above .spD + Thus,  
)1,( spp DC +∈ is a dominated strategy. The commercial software vendor would charge price at ),0( spp DC +∈ to 
guarantee the demand from the customers in the low-type segment. From the open source software vendor’s 
perspective, charging price at Dp  such that CD pfp >−  is a dominated strategy since such pricing would lead to 
zero demand for the open source software vendor. Thus, the open source software vendor would charge price at 
),0( fpp CD +∈ and serve the high-type customers. If an equilibrium exists, at equilibrium, the commercial 
software vendor uses a pricing strategy to serve the low-type customer segment while the open source software 
vendor serves the high-type customer segment. Consider the profit for the commercial software vendor: 
.)1)(1( CCC pp−−= µπ  
The optimization problem for the commercial software vendor is 
s.  subject to   Max C +≤ DCp ppC
π  
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The open source software vendor’s profit would be 
.)1( DDD pfp +−= µπ  
The optimization problem for the commercial software vendor is 
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=  is a Nash equilibrium. Consider the case when the open source 
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Suppose that .1≥f  Then .0
2
1* ≤−=− ffpD  Thus, the commercial software vendor cannot offer any price below 
,* fpD −  meaning that the commercial software vendor cannot serve any customer in the high-type segment. Since 
2
1* =Cp  is the price that maximizes profit from serving low-type segment, the commercial software vendor has no 
incentive to deviate from 
2
1* =Cp . Thus, 2
1* =Cp is a best response to 2
1* fpD
+
= . Now, suppose that .10 << f  
Then .0
2
1* >−=− ffpD  In this case, the commercial software vendor has two choices as below:  
Strategy 1: Stay at 
2
1* =Cp  and serve low-type customers only. 
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If ,21 cc ππ ≥  the commercial software vendor has no incentive to deviate. Note that µππ ≥⇔≥ fCC
21 . Therefore, 
2
1* =Cp is a best response to 2
1* fpD
+
=  if µ≥f . 
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Strategy 2: Deviate to spD −= 2
1*  and serve both segments. 
Denote 1Dπ  and 
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Dπ  be the profit for the commercial software vendor playing strategy 1 and 2, respectively. Then  
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QED. 
 
Proof of Proposition 5 
Note that a customer who chooses to play CC enjoys positive utility: 0 1 ≥− pv and 0 2 ≥− pv . For such customers, 
XX and CX are dominated by CC. Comparison of CC and CO is not trivial. Consider period 2. A high-type 
customer prefers the commercial software to the open source software if  
2111 pvpvwxfvpv −+−≤−++− . 
Note that 1 x  is the period 1 demand for the commercial software, which is, .1 1p− Thus, the above condition can be 
written as 
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fwpwp −≤+ 21 . 
A low-type customer stays with the commercial software if 
.










Since fw > , the commercial software vendor can serve both high-type and low-type customers in both periods by 
setting up its prices satisfying fwpwp −≤+ 21 . Then, the open source software’s best strategy is to price its 
support at the marginal cost and to make zero profit. The commercial software vendor’s profit is 







The optimization problem is then 
.  subject to   Max 21, 21
fwpwpCpp −≤+π  
The Lagrangean function can be defined as 
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Proof of Proposition 6 
Suppose that 1>α . Recall that  
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Let δ  be the difference between the commercial software price and the support charge for open source, i.e. 
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Since SSS ppc 2<≤  and 1>α , 
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Sp  Finally, **** 2)2(2 CCCS pppp >>−= α . QED. 
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